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ABSTRACT 
 Results of all special and general courts-martial in the Marine Corps from January 
2017 to August 2020 were analyzed for systemic differences in terms of trial outcomes 
and punishments. Trial outcomes were obtained from the Marine Corps’ legal database 
and combined with demographic and service data obtained from the Total Force Data 
Warehouse. Multiple regression analysis was performed with trial outcomes and various 
categories of punishments awarded utilized as outcome variables. Racial/ethnic, 
demographic, and service information were utilized as explanatory and control variables. 
The race/ethnicity of trial personnel, to include trial counsel, defense counsel, and 
military judge, were also analyzed to determine whether they impacted the outcome of 
the trial, or whether there were any effects on the interaction between the race/ethnicity 
of the accused and trial personnel. Outcomes were also analyzed within certain categories 
of misconduct, specifically trials where Marines were charged with misconduct 
concerning drug use, sexual misconduct, and the general article. The population 
representation of the Marine Corps was compared to the demographic makeup of the 
court-martial sample populations to identify instances of over- and under-representation. 
Significant over-representation of Black Marines and under-representation of White 
Marines was found in the courts-martial population. Trial outcomes and punishments 
were generally not influenced by any racial/ethnic factors. 
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The presumption within the military justice system is that all individuals are 
treated with equity. This presumption applies at every step in the military justice process 
and should not vary according to any individual characteristic or arbitrary factor, 
including race and ethnicity. Since the service was desegregated in 1948, there have been 
various efforts across the Department of Defense (DoD) to acknowledge and address 
instances of inequity within the military justice system, challenging this presumption. In 
2019, a study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) showed that the rates in 
which minority service-members experience investigation and courts-martial were 
disproportionate across all services compared to non-minority members. Decades prior in 
1972, the DoD commissioned a Task Force to analyze the administration of military 
justice within the Armed Forces, specifically how Black and Hispanic service-members 
experience military justice compared to their White counterparts. The Task Force 
uncovered many instances of systemic discrimination within the justice system, and made 
the following statement: 
The military does not stand apart from the society it serves and is not 
immune from the forces at work in society. As long as there is racial 
discrimination in American society—and the Task Force believes this has 
been proven and demonstrated beyond a doubt—there will be racial 
discrimination in the military. (Department of Defense, 1972) 
This is an enduring struggle within the military and mirrors the fight against 
discrimination and systemic bias across greater society.  
I analyzed the trial outcomes, punishment severities, and population 
representation proportions of all special and general courts-martial within the Marine 
Corps from January 2017 to August 2020. I attempted to determine if racial or ethnic 
characteristics influenced an individual's likelihood of conviction or punishment severity. 
I also analyzed these effects within certain categories of misconduct, within judge versus 
jury trials, and further attempted to identify any effect from the interaction of the race/
ethnicity of the accused and military justice personnel. Initially, I analyzed the population 
representation of individuals comprising the cohort of those court-martialed within my 
xvi 
sample timeframe. I determined that Black Marines were significantly and consistently 
over-represented in the sample relative to their service proportion. White Marines were 
similarly under-represented, and males were slightly over-represented compared to their 
service proportion. Figure ES-1 details the comparison between service representation 
and courts-martial sample representation for each subgroup for 2017 and 2018.  
 
 
Figure ES-1. 2017–2018 Active Enlisted Service and Courts-Martial Cohort Population 
Representation Comparison. Source: OUSD (2017, 2018). 
 
Within my regression analysis, I did not determine there were broad differences in 
terms of trial outcomes and punishments based on race/ethnicity with few exceptions. I 
determined that individuals with a racial category of “Other” (Native Hawaiians, Pacific 
Islanders, American Indian, and Alaskan Natives, and any other ethnicity not Hispanic) 
had a higher conviction rate overall, and were more likely to face conviction when other 
xvii 
factors were controlled for, but the sample size for those categorized as “Other” is small 
relative to the overall sample (31 out of 910), and a greater number of individuals should 
be analyzed prior to making a definitive conclusion regarding systemic differences for 
that subset.  
I did not note any differences based on the accused’s race/ethnicity in trial 
outcomes or punishment severities for specific categories of misconduct, judge versus 
jury trials, or in instances when the accused and military justice practitioners were the 
same race/ethnicity. I did note that Hispanic males were more likely to receive longer 
confinement sentences given a conviction at trial. Again, this warrants further analysis, as 
a host of different factors contribute to the adjudged length of confinement, and I was not 
able to sufficiently control for other factors to determine if this was an instance of 
systemic bias or due to other factors.  
At the onset, it appears that a lack of significant predictors for conviction or 
punishment severity within the regression models is evidence against bias, but we must 
look at the results in context of the population representation proportions. Black Marines 
are over-represented by nearly double their service proportion. To claim that systemic 
bias does not exist in trial outcomes, a significantly lesser conviction for Black Marines 
would be required to compensate for this over-representation. The systemic mechanism 
that is causing this over-representation is unclear, but even with equitable treatment in 
terms of trial outcomes and punishments, we are still convicting and punishing Black 




I recommend investigating any correlation between lack of minority 
representation in the officer ranks and leadership positions and instances of disciplinary 
actions taken against minority service-members. It would be beneficial to determine if 
units without minority representation in senior leadership positions send more minorities 
to courts-martial compared to those with minority representation. I recommend a uniform 
method for recording race/ethnicity across all service components to facilitate cross-
service analysis. Additionally, I recommend the Marine Corps' trial-record database 
xviii 
(CMS-LA, or Wolverine) interface with the Marine Corps Total Force System in order to 
make demographic data more reliably and accurately a part of the trial record and 
facilitate rapid analysis. Lastly, I recommend continued study, not just for the disparities 
noted within this paper, but for the sake of continued vigilance and awareness of the 
systemic mechanisms that influence all of our decisions. If we are aware that bias exists 
and that our own decision-making processes are susceptible, we can reduce the influence 
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Service in the United States Military is a diverse experience; the recruiting entities 
from each branch are encouraged to draw from all races, ethnicities, and social classes, 
with the objective of fielding the service with a heterogeneous population reflective of 
American society (Department of Defense, 2012). In 2009, the National Defense 
Authorization Act enacted the Military Leadership Diversity Commission that evaluated 
this objective and the greater cultural climate of the military in relation to inclusion and 
diversity (Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 2011). The commission found that 
many challenges and obstacles exist in the way of a thoroughly diverse force, with an 
underrepresentation of communities of color and women in senior ranks and leadership 
positions relative to the demographic fiber of the total force. Other recent studies have 
shown that some of the groups that are under-represented in higher ranks and leadership 
positions are over-represented in instances of non-judicial punishment, courts-martial, 
and administrative separation (Government Accountability Office, 2019). These 
disparities highlight the necessity to act, as noted by the commission, with 
recommendations including a call for creating a more inclusive environment and finding 
effective ways to address the military cultural issues that create impediments to 
advancement and dis-incentivize superior performance and continued service (MLDC, 
2011).  
The moral obligation to all service-members is fairness, impartiality, and an equal 
chance for every Marine, Sailor, Soldier, Airman, and Coast Guardsman to perform to the 
best of their ability, and for those individuals to be competitively considered for 
promotion and special programs irrespective of any demographic characteristic. General 
Mark Milley, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the following during 
congressional testimony in July of 2020: 
Equality and opportunity are matters of military readiness…We must 
thoroughly examine our institution and ensure it is a place where all 
Americans see themselves represented and have equal opportunity to 
succeed, especially in leadership positions. (Department of Defense 
Authorities and Roles, 2020) 
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This moral obligation for fairness, impartiality, and equity extends to the military 
justice system, with the expectation that individual characteristics will not play a role in a 
service member's chances of facing discipline, or the outcome of their trial and severity 
of punishment should they be brought to court-martial. Deficiencies in this area may 
influence the relationship between the racial and ethnic disparities within the military 
justice system and under-representation of minorities in higher ranks and leadership 
positions. Systemic bias can influence the way minority service-members face the 
military justice system, and the same bias may influence the outcomes of promotion and 
selection boards, job placement at accession, chances for combat deployment, and a host 
of other areas of a service member’s military experience (Armey, Berck, & Lipow, 
2019). The perception that minorities may face discriminatory practices could potentially 
influence their decision to remain in the service, compete for leadership positions, and 
perform to the best of their ability, highlighting the necessity to study this topic and 
remain vigilant against its presence within the service.   
A. PURPOSE 
Myriad studies have shown that minority service-members are more likely to face 
discipline and also less likely to fill the ranks of officer and leadership positions (DoD, 
1972; Christensen & Tsilker, 2017). Whether causation exists between the increased 
likelihood for discipline and the racial/ethnic disparities within the leadership ranks is 
unclear. These compelling inconsistencies are justification enough for the continued 
study and research into military diversity, prejudice, and bias, and how they can impact 
our military culture. The study of these topics builds awareness, and awareness begets 
vigilance against the factors that contribute to bias, including actions blatant and subtle, 
conscious and unconscious, intentional and systemic. Awareness and vigilance are a 
continuous process, and we must consistently analyze the service for indications that 
policies to combat discrimination are effective, whether our collective efforts are 
working, or if we are regressing. A single study is an imprint in time, but our actions are 
a journey, and sustained study is required to provide indications of progress or 
challenges.  
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B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study focusses on the Marine Corps, and more specifically on how racial and 
ethnic characteristics impact trial outcomes for special and general courts martial, the 
severity of punishments awarded when the accused is found guilty, and whether these 
findings vary according to category of misconduct. My research seeks to answer the 
following questions:   
∑ Between January 2017 and August 2020, has the Marine Corps 
demonstrated equity in trial outcomes for special and general courts-
martial, without regard for race or ethnicity?  
∑ Are there any systemic differences when examining trial outcomes for 
cases featuring charges within specific Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) articles?  
∑ Does the race/ethnicity of the trial counsel, defense counsel, or military 
judge have an influence on conviction rate or punishment awarded for the 
accused?  
∑ Are there disparities between the racial and ethnic population 
representations between the Marine Corps at large and those court-
martialed in the sampled years?  
My scope of analysis is all special and general courts-martial conducted in the 
Marine Corps from January 2017 to August 2020. Evidence exists in multiple studies that 
trial outcomes in terms of conviction and punishments may not be completely impartial, 
and that various demographic factors, race/ethnicity, and gender specifically, may also 
influence whether an individual is convicted, and the severity of their punishment if 
convicted. My expectation, based on my literature review of these studies, is that there is 
likely over-representation of minorities in the courts-martial population relative to the 
Marine Corps at large, and that outcomes and punishments may be impacted by race/
ethnic and other demographic factors.  
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Further, I attempted to determine if the racial characteristics of the trial counsel, 
defense counsel, military judge, and any interaction with the racial/ethnic characteristics 
of the accused influence the outcome of trial similarly. Hereafter, whenever I refer to the 
trial counsel, defense counsel, and military judge collectively, I will simply refer to them 
as military justice practitioners.  
Equity should stand no matter the category or severity of the alleged misconduct. 
As a part of this study, I isolated instances of misconduct wherein the accused was 
charged with specific UCMJ articles to determine if certain categories of misconduct 
differ than others in terms of parity.  
One item that would provide additional insight to the analysis is the demographic 
characteristics of the alleged victim, especially in cases that involve sexual misconduct. 
For multiple procedural, administrative, and privacy issues, this information was not able 
to be gathered for this study. It is imperative to protect the identity of victims of sexual 
assault, but anonymously obtaining victim demographic data may be beneficial for future 
studies.  
C. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
I found that generally, no single race/ethnicity was more likely to be convicted at 
courts-martial or face more severe punishments. I did find significant over-representation 
of Black Marines within the population of those court-martialed between 2017–2020 
relative to their service population representation, and significant under-representation of 
White Marines within the same category. Black Marines who were the subject of courts-
martial were also more likely than other races to have been the subject of non-judicial 
punishment. The racial/ethnic divide between the court-martial population and military 
justice practitioners was stark, with minority accused much less likely to be represented 
by minority counsel than White counsel.  
Even with fairly equitable conviction rates and punishment severities regardless 
of race/ethnicity, Black Marines were convicted and punished at courts-martial at a rate 
5 
higher than other races across the Marine Corps, owing to over-representation within the 
courts-martial population.  
Marines with a race categorized under “Other” did show an increased likelihood 
for conviction and an increase for some punishment severities, but the small number of 
Marines belonging to this category relative to the overall population is cause for further 
investigation rather than evidence for systemic bias. Hispanic males and males in general 
also were more likely to experience longer incarceration rates. Similarly, this is cause for 
further investigation and research due to myriad factors that influence the adjudged 
confinement length, and lack of sufficient controls within my data to determine if this is a 
function of race/ethnicity, or some other factor.  
D. APPROACH TO RESEARCH 
I utilized the reports of courts-martial to determine the race/ethnic population 
representations within the cohort of all those accused at courts-martial during the sample 
years. Dividing the quantity of each individual race/ethnic subgroup by the quantity of 
total courts-martial yielded population representations within this dataset. These figures 
were grouped by calendar year and compared to the Marine Corps-wide race/ethnic 
population representation figures for years 2017 and 2018—the most recently available 
population representation statistics compiled by the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense – Personnel and Readiness (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2017, 
2018). This demonstrated any disparities between the two sub-groups. In a perfectly 
equitable scenario, we would expect the percentages to align within a reasonable margin. 
Establishing any over or under representation among race/ethnic categories provides 
context to the next phase of my analysis, which is likelihood of conviction and severity of 
punishment as a function of individual race/ethnicity, with controls for demographics and 
service characteristics.  
Utilizing conviction and/or severity of punishment as outcome variables, I 
performed ordinary least-squares regressions for outcomes associated with conviction 
and severity of punishment. My main explanatory variables are the race/ethnicity of the 
accused, their trial and defense counsel, and the military judge associated with the trial. I 
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utilized a variety of demographic and service variables as controls to isolate the 
regression effects to race/ethnic characteristics. The results are displayed in tables and 
graphs, with statistically significant outcomes highlighted. I performed these same 
regressions but limited the populations to specific categories of alleged misconduct, 
identified by which charges are detailed under the UCMJ. I did this specifically for cases 
associated with drug offenses, sexual misconduct, and general offenses. This allowed me 
to isolate the effects further within these misconduct subgroups. Lastly, I performed the 
same regressions but limited the population to instances of trials with a jury as the 
sentencing authority compared to those with a military judge.    
7 
II. BACKGROUND
A. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND RECENT INSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS
TO COMBAT BIAS
There has been an increase in efforts to address the subject of bias and
discrimination within the service in recent years with legislation, directives, and guidance 
from civilian and military leadership (Esper, 2020), (Berger, 2020). These acknowledge 
that work must continue to build a climate of equal opportunity, and that an active 
approach is necessary to address cultural issues within the service that may be prejudicial 
to an inclusive command climate, opportunity for equal treatment, and a uniform path to 
retention and promotion.  
Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper issued a memorandum on 14 July 2020 
that mandated both short- and long-term approaches towards building a more inclusive 
culture. Efforts include broad policy changes to address unconscious bias, educating 
service-members on bias and prejudice, and greater mandates to gather data to help 
analyze these efforts and identify areas where bias or discrimination exist unchecked 
(Esper, 2020). Much of the implementation was left to the individual branches, with each 
developing a service-tailored plan.   
Even prior to the Secretary of Defense’s guidance, Marine Corps Commandant 
General Berger issued similar guidance to the Corps, with direction to remove all 
confederate paraphernalia from Marine Corps Installations, make certain combat military 
occupational specialties available to women, and other initiatives aimed at a progressive 
migration of the Corps’ culture and ethos (Berger, 2020). Additionally, decisive steps 
were taken to measure and address manifestations of unconscious bias, which included 
the elimination of consideration of photographs for promotion and special selection 
boards (United States Marine Corps, 2020a), and closer monitoring of the quarterly 
criminal activity reports for demographic trends in non-judicial punishments and courts-
martial across the Marine Corps (USMC, 2020b).  
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B. GENERAL FIGURES ON DISPARITIES WITHIN PROMOTION, 
LEADERSHIP, AND MILITARY JUSTICE 
These actions to address our culture indicate a renewed drive to locate and 
address instances of discrimination, bias, inequity, and prejudice, but the majority of 
literature, studies, and reports conducted over the last 50 years show that this remains an 
elusive objective. There is much data to suggest that minorities and women in the service 
are not promoted and selected for special programs commensurate with White males. 
While the junior ranks approximate the demographic composition of society, this is not 
the case for non-commissioned officers and officers. In 2011, a congressional report 
determined that while non-Hispanic Whites comprise 66 percent of the population, they 
comprise 77 percent of the officer population (MLDC, 2011). While Black individuals 
represent 12 percent of the population, they only make up 8 percent of the active-duty 
officer population, as shown in Figure 1. Stark disparities also exist in the respective 
populations for women. The active-duty General Officer ranks are even more skewed, 
with mostly single-digit population representations of both women and minorities 
(MLDC, 2011).  
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Figure 1. Racial/Ethnic Minority and Female Shares of Officers and Enlisted 
Personnel by Component, September 2008. 
Source: MLDC (2011). 
In addition to promotion and selection, there has been much study into how race, 
gender, and other demographic factors influence an individual’s likelihood to face 
disciplinary measures during their time in service. The Government Accountability 
Office published a report in 2019 showing certain racial minorities were more likely to be 
investigated for misconduct and brought to trial across the Department of Defense and 
Coast Guard (GAO, 2019). Another report compiled by the “Protect Our Defenders” 
organization similarly found that enlisted members belonging to a minority race were 
significantly more likely to face punishments, either non-judicial punishment or court-
martial, in a given year compared to White service-members (Christensen & Tsilker, 
2017). That same report found that racial minorities also were more likely than their 
White counterparts to be found guilty at courts-martial in the Air Force and Marine 
Corps.  
This represents an ubiquitous pattern that is not limited to military service and is 
pervasive throughout society. The microcosm of discrimination, bias, and prejudice 
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within the Armed Services has only recently received due attention in the decades since 
the service was de-segregated after World War II (Executive Order No. 9981, 1948). The 
continuous process of recognizing, researching, combatting, and addressing these issues 
is an essential part of the journey towards fulfilling the moral obligation to shape our 
service in a manner that is free from bias, discrimination, and prejudice.  
C. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Commanding Officers are typically the convening authority and decision makers 
when it comes to bringing an allegation of misconduct into the realm of military justice. 
Once an alleged violation of the UCMJ occurs, the Commanding Officer has several 
options available at their discretion. For lower-level offenses, informal or formal 
counseling may be deemed appropriate, and this may or may not be included in a service 
member’s career files. As the severity of the misconduct increases, a Commanding 
Officer may decide to administer non-judicial punishment (NJP) to a service member 
under Article 15 of the UCMJ. This is a method for dealing with minor offenses, has 
limited options available for punishment, and is not considered a judicial proceeding. In 
most cases, a service member may either accept punishment at NJP, or deny non-judicial 
proceedings, opting instead to face a trial court-martial (Manual for Courts-Martial, 
2019) If a service-member maintains their innocence in light of allegations brought for at 
NJP, they may demand a trial at courts-martial which affords them the greater burden of 
proof required at courts-martial and representation by defense counsel for special and 
general cases.  
Should a Commanding Officer decide to try a service-member at courts-martial, 
there are three levels: summary, special, and general courts-martial.  The standard of 
proof required for conviction at all levels of courts-martial is “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” (Voting and Rulings, 2016). A summary court-martial (SCM) may be convened 
by the unit Commanding Officer, has limited maximum punishments, and is administered 
locally by an officer designated by the command (Who May Convene Summary Courts-
Martial, 2016). SCMs are used for lesser offenses to be tried under the UCMJ. The 
accused is not afforded military representation, but may provide counsel at their expense. 
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Per rule 1301 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, maximum punishments for SCM 
includes confinement for one-month, hard labor without confinement for 45 days, 
restriction, forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay for one month, a fine of up to two-
thirds of one month of the highest rate of pay, and reduction to E-1 (MCM, 2019).  
Special courts-martial (SPCM) are for more serious offenses. The convening 
authority for SPCM is typically at the O-6 level (Who May Convene Special Courts-
Martial, 2016). SPCMs are administered by a military judge with the option of a jury 
with four members, and the service member is provided military representation (Courts-
Martial Classified, 2016). Maximum punishments are greater than SCM, with periods of 
confinement up to one year, forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay for one year, a 
fine of up to two-thirds of one year of the highest rate of pay, and bad-conduct discharge 
from the service (MCM, 2019). 
General courts-martial are reserved for the most serious allegations of 
misconduct. Similar to a SPCM, a GCM is administered by a military judge with the 
option of a jury panel comprised of eight military members, twelve for capital cases. 
(Courts-Martial Classified, 2016) Service-members are afforded military representation. 
Maximum punishments for GCM vary according to UCMJ article of misconduct, but 
include up to life in prison, death, total forfeitures of pay and allowance, reduction to E-1, 
and dishonorable discharge from the service (MCM, 2019). 
Similar to a civilian court, service-members are either acquitted or found guilty at 
the conclusion of the trial, and punishments are determined by the sentencing authority. 
Service-members are often charged under one or more articles of the UCMJ, but are only 
required to be found guilty on one account to incur conviction and punishment. Pre-trial 
agreements may be entered on the advice of their counsel, and service-members may not 
be compelled to testify against themselves (MCM, 2019). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
After President Truman issued executive order 9981 in 1948, the nation took the 
first steps towards addressing discrimination in the service. The order states that “there 
shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services 
without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin” (Exec. Order No. 9981, 1948). 
This was a watershed moment for the United States which had previously segregated 
Black from White service-members, but represented only the beginning stages towards 
equal treatment.  
A. DOD TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCE 
Nearly a quarter-century after the signing of Executive Order 9981, the executive 
branch established a task force to gather data and analyze racial issues, equality, and 
discrimination within the service, and how those specifically impact the administration of 
military justice. The task force stated among their findings that “the military services are 
influenced by broad societal practices, including racial discrimination,” and specifically 
investigated instances of both intentional and systemic racial discrimination (DoD, 1972). 
Their findings were compelling, with a disproportionate representation of instances of 
investigation and punishment among racial minorities, compared with their share of the 
service population. In 1972, Black service-members comprised 21 percent and 16.2 
percent of the Army and Marines, respectively, but were the subject of 26.1 percent and 
23.3 percent of reports of misconduct. The commission also examined instances of 
soldiers going absent without leave (AWOL) in the Army, with 27.8 percent of cases 
being attributed to Black soldiers, compared with the 21 percent service percentage. 
Further, Black soldiers who went AWOL received non-judicial punishment 71.7 percent 
of the time, compared to only 63.1 percent for White soldiers (DoD, 1972). This study 
hypothesized that the reason for disproportionate representation was not disparate rates of 
misconduct, but rather because leadership seem inclined to “single-out” minority service-
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members for instances of wrongdoing, and overlook commissions of the same types of 
misconduct by White service-members (DoD, 1972).  
While the study found that Black service-members were more likely to be 
investigated and charged with misconduct, it did not note significant differences in trial 
outcomes or punishments between differences races given the same category of 
misconduct (DoD, 1972). Further, the commission found that minority service-members 
were more likely to face Article 15 (non-judicial punishment), had higher rates longer 
and periods of pre-trial confinement, and represented a disproportionate percentage of 
courts-martial, service correctional facility populations, and administrative discharges 
(DoD, 1972). Also among their findings was that a connection exists between racial 
representation in the higher ranks, and increased difficulties faced by minority service-
members for competitive job specialties and promotion (DoD, 1972). While this report is 
nearly 50 years old, it established the baseline for the for the DoD’s attempt to address 
these issues and also preemptively echoed the findings of numerous subsequent studies.  
B. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT 19–344 
In May 2019, the United States Government Accountability Office issued a report 
to the Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives titled “Military 
Justice – DoD and the Coast Guard Need to Improve Their Capabilities to Assess Racial 
and Gender Disparities.” As indicated by the title, differences in how the diverse services 
record racial and demographic data made it difficult to evenly compare treatment across 
the DoD. The study still found that Black, Hispanic, and male service-members faced 
rates of investigation, non-judicial punishment, and courts-martial at a rate higher than 
their than their service proportion when compared to Whites and women (GAO, 2019). 
This finding was only for the Air Force and Marines, as the other services did not 
maintain adequate data to analyze their practices. Additionally, when examining the 
outcomes of trials at special and general courts-martial, race generally did not play a 
significant role in conviction rates across the services (GAO, 2019). Gender was 
statistically significant for the Marine Corps, with female Marines convicted at special 
and general courts-martial at rates less than male Marines. Further, most indications show 
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that race and gender did not play a significant role in the severity of punishments 
following conviction at courts-martial, with the Navy and Marine Corps showing slightly 
lesser punishments in this category for Black Sailors and women, respectively (GAO, 
2019).  
C. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN MILITARY JUSTICE 
A 2017 report from an organization known as “Protect Our Defenders” analyzed 
data received by means of the Freedom of Information Act, and came to similar 
conclusions as the GAO report. Based on the service, this organization found that Black 
service-members were between 1.29 and 2.61 times as likely to be the subjects of 
investigation or disciplinary proceedings when compared to White service-members 
(Christensen & Tsilker, 2017). Asians were less likely than Whites to be the subject 
investigation or disciplinary proceedings. One item did conflict with the GAO report, in 
that Protector Our Defenders found that from 2006 to 2015, Black Marines were as much 
as 2.61 times as likely as White Marines to be convicted, albeit specifically at general 
courts-martial (Christensen & Tsilker). The other services did not demonstrate a 
significant difference in conviction rate at courts-martial based on race (Christensen & 
Tsilker, 2017). 
D. THE EQUITY OF PUNISHMENT IN THE NAVAL ACADEMY 
CONDUCT SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
I attempted to locate instances where similar studies have examined the topic of 
race/ethnicity within the military justice system through a scholarly lens, but there was 
very little available within that category. One useful instance of analysis of a similar topic 
is found in a Naval Postgraduate School thesis titled “The Equity of Punishment in the 
Naval Academy Conduct System.” In this thesis, Lieutenant Matthew Waesche analyzed 
the Naval Academy’s Administrative Conduct System which was utilized to administer 
discipline to Midshipmen from 1998 to 2001. Through multiple regression analysis, LT 
Waesche found systemic inequity, with women and minority midshipmen being more 
likely to face discipline and receive a more severe form of punishment compared to 
White male Midshipmen (Waesche, 2002). Both women and minority Midshipmen 
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represented a greater share of the yearly discipline cases relative to their population 
proportions, indicating an over-representation for instances of adjudicated misconduct. 
The level of punishment was quantified with the number of demerits awarded per given 
instance of misconduct, and inequity was recorded here with statistical significance for 
several categories. Specifically, Black and Asian Midshipmen received on average 1.534 
and 1.643 more demerits than White Midshipmen, and female Midshipmen received an 
average of 1.351 more demerits than males (Waesche, 2002). While Midshipmen are not 
service-members and the discipline system at the Naval Academy is separate from the 
UCMJ, this microcosm represents a parallel structure of military justice and is plagued by 
many of the same inequities and inconsistencies shown in the studies of military justice 
(Waesche, 2002). 
E. RACIAL SELECTION IN DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN 
I have discussed the role race/ethnicity plays in promotions, selection, and 
discipline, but studies have shown that bias and inequity can extend to many other areas 
of military service. In 2019, a study by Laura Armey, Peter Berck, and Jonathon Lipow 
found that Black Soldiers in the U.S. Army who served between 2001 and 2003 were 
over-represented in non-combat jobs compared to their White counterparts. Additionally, 
the study showed that Black Soldiers were less likely to serve and deploy with combat 
units, and those Black Soldiers that deployed with combat units were less likely to see 
combat, and more likely to be excluded from deployments or be sent home from 
deployments due to disciplinary action (Armey, Berck, & Lipow, 2019). While a host of 
factors influence an individual’s experience in job selection and deployments, the authors 
found that their findings were “consistent with a pattern of systematic institutional bias or 
discrimination against Blacks in the US Armed Forces” (Armey, Berck, & Lipow, 2019).  
F. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN POLICE 
USE OF FORCE 
This topic is certainly not limited to military justice. The DoD Task Force from 
1972 stated “the military does not stand apart from the society it serves and is not 
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immune from the forces at work in society” (DoD, 1972). Those of us serving in the 
military represent the society from which we were recruited. All service-members were 
civilians first, and the opinions, perceptions, and biases that reside within all of us are 
shaped by our environment and influences during those formative years. Our military 
culture is an amalgam of our different backgrounds, and it is not unexpected that bias and 
discrimination from civilian society would permeate our military.  
I utilized civilian rates of arrest in this study as a civilian comparison to courts-
martial rates, as arrest rates are one of the closest reasonable civilian comparisons to 
courts-martial on which data was available. On the subject of civilian arrests, Roland 
Fryer showed in his 2016 study titled “An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in 
Police Use of Force” that Black and Hispanic civilians were as much as twice as likely to 
be stopped or arrested by police compared to White civilians. He also found that use of 
any type of force during a police encounter was similarly much more likely for minorities 
(Fryer, 2016). While this reflects one facet of the justice system in broader American 
society, it is not unexpected that the disparities, bias, and prejudice that are evidenced by 
these findings filter through to the culture of the military as well, and play a role in 





Through summary statistics and multiple models and iterations of regression 
analysis, I analyzed population representation of individual characteristics, and the 
correlation between dependent variables of interest, namely chance of conviction and 
severity of punishment, and multiple explanatory and control variables.  
B. OVERVIEW OF DATA 
1. Data Set from CMS-LA 
A data-set was obtained from the Marine Corps' Case Management System - 
Legal (CMS-LA), which contained all special and general courts-martial results from 
January 2017 through August 2020. The variables present in this data set are detailed in 
Table 1. After extracting the Electronic Interchange Personal Identifier (EDIPI) for the 
accused, trial and defense counsel, and military judge, a second data request was made 
through the Marine Corps' Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) for additional 
explanatory variables. 
Table 1. Data from CMS-LA 
Data Column Description 
EDIPI The Accused's Electronic Data Interface Personal Identifier 
Last Name The Accused's Last Name 
First Name The Accused's First Name 
M.I. The Accused's Middle Initial 
Court Type Category of Court-Martial (Special or General) 
TC Name of Trial Counsel 
TC Service Trial Counsel Service (Marine Corps or Navy) 
DC  Name of Defense Counsel 
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Data Column Description 
DC Service Defense Counsel Service 
MJ Name of Military Judge 
MJ Service Military Judge Service 
Composition Jury Composition (Enlisted, Officer/Enlisted, Officer, Judge 
Alone) 
Disposition Type Trial Outcome (Guilty or Acquitted) 
Date Disposition Date of Trial Completion 
PTA Existence of a Pre-Trial Agreement 
Pleas and Findings Details about the Individual Charges  
Sentence Details about the Sentence/Punishment Adjudged 
 
2. Data Set from TFDW 
The additional explanatory variables requested from the TFDW for the accused 
and military justice practitioners are listed in Tables 2 and 3.  
Table 2. Data from TFDW on the Accused 
Data Column Description 
EDIPI The Accused's Electronic Interface Data Personal Identifier 
Last Name The Accused's Last Name 
First Name The Accused's First Name 
Grade The Accused's Military Pay Grade 
Age Age of the Accused 
Race Race Code in Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) 
Race Description Description of Race Code 
Ethnic Group Code Ethnic Code in MCTFS 
Ethnic Group 
Description 
Description of Ethnic Code 
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Data Column Description 
MOS Military Occupation Specialty 
Years of Service Years of Service 
Sex Sex of Accused 
Date of Rank Date of Current Rank 
AFQT Score Armed Forces Qualification Test Score 
GCT  General Classification Score 
NJP NJP Flag 
 
Table 3. Data from TFDW on Military Justice Practitioners 
Data Column Description 
EDIPI Military Justice Practitioner’s Electronic Interface Data 
Personal Identifier 
Last Name Military Justice Practitioner’s Last Name 
First Name Military Justice Practitioner’s First Name 
Grade Military Justice Practitioner’s Military Pay Grade 
Race Race Code in MCTFS 
Race Description Description of Race Code 
Ethnic Group Code Ethnic Code in MCTFS 
Ethnic Group 
Description 
Description of Ethnic Code 
 
3. Dependent Variables 
The regressions in this study have several different dependent variables in order to 
facilitate answering the research questions. The two main dependent variables are 
whether an individual is convicted at courts-martial, and the individual's severity of 
punishment if they were convicted at courts-martial.  
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a. Trial Outcome 
A conviction at trial is coded as 1 and an acquittal at trial coded as 0. 
b. Punishment 
Punishments awarded as a result of a conviction at special and general courts-
martial may include reprimand, forfeiture of pay and allowances, fine, reduction in pay 
grade, restriction to specified limits, hard-labor without confinement, confinement, 
punitive separation, and death (limited to general courts-martial with capital cases). Each 
category of punishment has a range of severity based on rank, offense, and other 
specifications. There are two characterizations of service that may be awarded during 
punitive discharge, which also vary by a number of specifications (MCM, 2019). For the 
purpose of this study, I focused my analysis on monetary fines/forfeitures, reduction in 
pay grade, confinement, and punitive discharge. 
Monetary fines/forfeitures were assessed in the form of a continuous variable with 
the amount of the fine tantamount to punishment severity. Per 10 U.S. Code § 858b – Art. 
58b., conviction at special and general courts-martial that results in confinement and/or 
discharge may incur a minimum sentence that includes withholding of two-thirds or all of 
a member's pay and allowances for the confinement period, depending on the category of 
misconduct and type of courts-martial. Additionally, the military judge may exercise 
discretion in withholding pay and allowances in these circumstances so as not to 
negatively impact the service-member's dependents during their confinement, should they 
have them. Based on the data obtained, it is difficult to determine if forfeitures of pay and 
allowances during confinement are impacted by either minimum sentencing or the 
discretion of the judge relative to the accused's dependents, and those independently 
adjudged. Due to this lack of clarity, I only analyzed forfeitures and fines that were 
awarded outside of confinement which are not impacted by either minimum sentences or 
withholding discretions. For instance, if a Marine was sentenced to 10 months 
confinement and a forfeiture of $1,000 per month for 12 months, I only recorded $2,000 
of forfeitures for that observation. The $1,000 per month withheld during confinement 
may be impacted by minimum sentencing standards or withholding discretions, but the 
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forfeiture collected outside the confinement window is not compounded by those effects. 
If a Marine was not sentenced to any confinement and was awarded forfeiture of $1,000 
per month for 12 months, I recorded the entire $12,000. All fines were recorded at the 
value awarded at sentencing, and are not impacted by minimum sentencing standards, 
withholding discretion, or suspensions. The amount of forfeitures and fines were 
combined to a single amount representing the total pecuniary penalty.  
A trial outcome that results in reduction in grade is indicated by a 1 if the Marine 
was reduced and a 0 otherwise. There is no distinction between an E-2 reduced to E-1 or 
an E-9 reduced to E-1, only that the Marine was reduced. Limitations on the data 
collected prevent additional insight to severity of individual instances of grade reduction. 
Officers may not be reduced at courts-martial. 
Confinement is measured in months adjudged at the conclusion of trial. For the 
purposes of this study, only confinements are measured and not instances of restriction to 
specified limits. If a Marine is awarded a quantity of days of confinement not 
corresponding to multiples of 30, I divided the amount by 30 and record the figure as 
such. For example, an observation where a Marine is awarded with 125 days of 
confinement would be represented by 4.167 months. Credit for time served prior to trial, 
sentencing suspensions, and sentencing impacts from pre-trial agreements are not 
factored due to limitations in data. The figure recorded is the initial length of the 
confinement as determined by the sentencing authority.  
Punitive discharge is measured as a binary outcome and not in terms of severity of 
category of discharge. All individuals awarded a punitive discharge at the conclusion of 
trial were assigned a 1, and all others a 0.  
Multiple punishments are frequently awarded at the conclusion of trial, but each 
regression with a punishment as the dependent variable only analyzes one punishment at 
a time as the outcome.  
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4. Independent Variables 
The main explanatory variables in this data-set are the individual's race/ethnicity 
and gender, and the race/ethnicity of the trial/defense counsel and military judge. 
Additional control variables include officer/enlisted, MOS (used to determine a binary 
outcome for Infantry), age, time in service (TIS), etc.  
a. Race/Ethnicity 
The Marine Corps utilizes several different methods for capturing race and 
ethnicity within their manpower systems, including: “Race AGG Code, Race Code, 
Ethnic Group, and Ethnic Code.” Marines are generally responsible for providing their 
own information regarding race and ethnicity at accession. Marines are also permitted to 
not provide any data about their race/ethnicity if they so desire. The race/ethnic 
information is input into MCTFS and is stored according to the information in Tables 4 
and 5. 
Table 4. Marine Corps Race Codes. Source: USMC (2013). 
Code Description 
A American Indian or Alaska Native 
B Asian 
C Black or African American 
D Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
E White 




Table 5. Marine Corps Ethnic Group Codes. Source: USMC (2013). 
Code Description 
1 Other Hispanic 
2 US/Can Indian 
3 Other Asian 
4 PR (Puerto Rican) 
5 Filipino 
6 Mexican 













Q Other Pacific Islander 








The following groups were created based on these categories of responses: 
∑ White - This includes all individuals who identify as White and not 
Hispanic. Within the regressions in this study, the White and Asian race 
collectively are utilized as the reference group.  
∑ Black  
∑ Asian 
∑ Other - This includes Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, American Indian, 
Alaskan Native, or other ethnicity not Hispanic   
∑ Missing - If an individual declined to provide either race or ethnicity, they 
were categorized as missing. 
∑ Hispanic - If an individual list their ethnicity as Hispanic but lists another 
race, they are categorized only as Hispanic.  
For each race/ethnicity, a 1 will indicate an individual belongs to that group and a 
0 otherwise. An individual within this study is only categorized under one of the 
previously mentioned race/ethnic groups. I also created variables for “Black Male” and 
“Hispanic Male” by interacting the respective race/ethnicity variables and sex variable.  
b. Sex 
This variable indicates the sex of the individual, with a 1 for males and 0 for 
females.  
c. Trial Counsel, Defense Counsel, Military Judge  
Military justice practitioners are coded for their racial/ethnic characteristics the 
same as the accused. If the trial records did not include information on military justice 
practitioners, or the individual otherwise declined to provide racial/ethnic information, 
they were captured as missing. For the purpose of analysis, I created additional variables 
capturing the interactive effects of the race/ethnicity of the accused and military justice 
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practitioners. These variables are titled “Trial Counsel and Accused the Same,” “Defense 
Counsel and Accused the Same,” and “Military Judge and Accused the Same.” In all 
cases where the respective military justice practitioners and accused are the same race/
ethnicity, including when the accused is White and the respective military justice 
practitioners are Asian and vice versa, this is indicated by a 1 and a 0 otherwise.  
d. Infantry MOS 
If an individual retains an MOS that belongs to the Infantry community (03xx), 
this was indicated by a 1. All other MOS groups, to include combat service support, 
aviation, law, etc. were indicated by a 0.  
e. Age 
This is a continuous variable represented by the age in years of the individual.  
f. Years of Service 
This is a continuous variable represented by the number of years of service based 
on the individual's Armed Forces Active-Duty Base Date.  
g. Categories of Misconduct 
Indicator variables were created to represent if an individual was accused of the 
following UCMJ articles: 
∑ Article 112a (drug related offenses) 
∑ Articles 120x (sexual misconduct) 
∑ Article 134 (general article) 
A 1 signifies an individual was charged under one of the preceding UCMJ 
articles, and a 0 for all three variables indicates charges under other UCMJ articles not 
specifically analyzed in this study. Often an individual was charged under multiple 
UCMJ articles, but it was not possible to determine under which article the accused was 
found guilty. These variables only indicate the presence of the charge, and not necessary 
a guilty finding of that specific charge.  
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h. Jury Trial 
If the trial featured a jury, the variable is assigned a 1. If the trial was decided by a 
military judge alone, the variable is assigned a 0. 
5. Data Cleaning and Merging 
The dataset obtained from CMS-LA contained 1065 observations of courts-
martial from January 2017 to August 2020. This dataset contained the EDIPIs of the 
accused, but only names and rank of military justice practitioners. In order to obtain 
additional data on military justice practitioners from TFDW, individual EDIPIs had to be 
researched for each trial counsel, defense counsel, and military judge from the Marine 
Profile interface from the Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) web portal. In cases 
where the EDIPIs could not be located or where the military justice practitioners were 
members of a different service, the cells were left blank.  
EDIPIs in the CMS-LA data for the accused were searched for duplicate and 
dubious values. There were instances where the same EDIPI was used for different 
individuals, generic EDIPIs (1234567890) were input, or the EDIPI did not correspond 
otherwise to the individual indicated as the accused in the trial record. I made every 
attempt to locate the correct EDIPI from the Marine Profile interface from M&RA for 
accused individuals. In cases where the EDIPI could not be corrected, the observation 
was omitted. After reviewing, obtaining, and cleaning EDIPIs for the accused and 
military justice practitioners, the separate request for demographic data was submitted to 
and obtained from TFDW.  
Utilizing the EDIPI as the common vector in both datasets, I then utilized the 
VLOOKUP function in Microsoft Excel to merge columns of data together into one 
dataset. Prior to blending all columns of data, I cross-validated all observations by 
comparing the last names of each observation as retrieved by the common EDIPI, and 
then reviewed for inconsistencies. There were several instances where a valid EDIPI was 
input into CMS-LA, but the EDIPI did not correspond to the same Marine as retrieved by 
TFDW. This was only determined after obtained detailed demographic data from TFDW, 
and those observations were omitted. 
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Lastly, the dataset was reviewed to locate any duplicate trial records. Those 
records were omitted, and the final dataset contained 922 observations. A unique trial 
identifier was added, and the accused and military justice practitioners were assigned a 
unique numerical identifier that did not correspond to their EDIPI or any other personally 
identifiable feature. EDIPIs and names for all individuals were then sanitized from the 
dataset. There are no outcomes or information as a part of this study that can be tied to 
any individual on which data was obtained.  
6. Summary Statistics 
The following tables are descriptive statistics of the final merged dataset. For 
binary variables, the corresponding decimal for the mean column is the proportion of the 
observations holding that particular characteristic. For instance, 0.018 or 1.8 percent of 
all accused were officers. Binary values do not show a minimum and maximum value, 
and the mean column is the average of all observations for that variable.  
Table 6 details descriptive demographic, service, and racial/ethnic characteristics 
of the accused. These characteristics are observations at the time of data collection, which 
was February 2021. Ideally, these characteristics would reflect the accused at the date of 
trial, but it is not possible to aggregate the data as such with current Marine Corps 
collection methods. The variables Age, Years of Service, and NJP are negatively affected 
by this. Age and Years of Service potentially are recorded as much as four years and one 
month greater for a single observation if the trial was held in January 2017. The NJP 
variable is confounded by the possibility that the NJP occurred post-trial. The 
misrepresentations for Age and Years of Service would likely be distributed evenly 
across the dataset and should not prevent the regression models from reliably predicting 
the impact to the dependent variables. The impacts to NJP are likely small. The NJP 
variable was only utilized for summary statistics and not as an explanatory variable in 
any regression models.  
Officers only represented 1.8 percent of the accused, the average age was 26, and 
20.1 percent held an Infantry MOS. 96.5 percent were males, the average AFQT score 
was 58.9, and the average length of service at either time of data collection or date of 
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separation was 6.2 years. 47.7 percent of the accused were White, 21.7 percent were 
Black, and 23.6 percent were Hispanic.     
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of the Accused 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 Officer 922 0.018 .135   
 Age 922 25.985 5.977 18 59 
 Combat Arms 922 .201 .401   
 Years of Service 922 6.203 5.683 0 38 
 Sex 922 .965 .183   
 AFQT Score 922 58.956 18.002 0 99 
 GCT Score 922 105.83 14.065 0 147 
 NJP 922 .317 .465   
      
 White 922 .477 .5   
 Black 922 .217 .412   
 Asian 922 .031 .175   
 Other 922 .034 .18   
 Missing 922 .025 .156   
 Hispanic 922 .236 .425   
      
      
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for the racial/ethnic characteristics of the 
trial counsel, defense counsel, and military judge. Individual military justice practitioners 
were often present for multiple trials, with each appearance generating the corresponding 
data for the observation. If there was no information available for military justice 
practitioners for an observation, it was captured as missing. If the individual declined to 
provide racial/ethnic data, it was also captured as missing.  
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Military Justice Practitioners 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.   
 Trial Counsel White 922 .789 .409   
 Trial Counsel Black 922 .016 .127   
 Trial Counsel Asian 922 .013 .113   
 Trial Counsel Other 922 .076 .265   
 Trial Counsel Missing 922 .044 .206   
 Trial Counsel Hispanic 922 .063 .243   
 Trial Counsel Minority 922 .154 .361   
      
 Defense Counsel White 922 .698 .459   
 Defense Counsel Black 922 .035 .183   
 Defense Counsel Asian 922 .042 .201   
 Defense Counsel Other 922 .025 .156   
 Defense Counsel 
Missing 
922 .174 .379   
 Defense Counsel 
Hispanic 
922 .034 .18   
 Defense Counsel 
Minority 
922 .086 .28   
      
 Military Judge White 922 .58 .494   
 Military Judge Black 922 .093 .291   
 Military Judge Asian 922 .028 .166   
 Military Judge Other 922 0 0   
 Military Judge Missing 848 .237 .426   
 Military Judge Hispanic 922 .08 .272   
 Military Judge Minority 922 .174 .379   
      
 TC and Accused Same 922 .437 .496   
 DC and Accused Same 922 .401 .49   
 MJ and Accused Same 922 .35 .477   
 
Table 8 displays descriptive statistics for the trial characteristics. 91.1 percent of 
trials resulted in a conviction, 23.1 percent involved drug charges, 21.8 percent involved 
sexual misconduct, and 32.3 percent featured a charge under Article 134. Of note, the 
punitive variables: Discharge, Confinement Months, Fine, and Reduction, are summaries 
of only trials where the accused was found guilty. 
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics of Trial Characteristics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 Trial Outcome 922 .911 .285   
 Jury Trial 922 .184 .388   
 Pre-Trial Agreement 922 .4 .49   
 Drug Offense 922 .231 .422   
 Sexual Offense 922 .218 .413   
 General Article 922 .323 .468   
 Discharge 840 .724 .447   
 Confinement Months 840 22.625 56.77 0 600 
 Fine 840 394.954 2669.192 0 66000 
 Reduction 840 .839 .367   
 
A summary of trial outcomes broken down by race/ethnicity is shown in Table 9. 
Note that the conviction rate for those categorized as “Other” is greater than the sample 
mean, but the sample size for “Other” is relatively small compared to the other race/
ethnic categories. The conviction rate for Hispanic Marines is also 2.65 percentage points 
greater than White Marines.  
Table 9. Trial Outcomes by Race/Ethnicity 
 
 
Race/Ethnicity of Accused Convicted Acquitted  
 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage    
       
White 399 90.68  41 9.32   
Black 177 88.5  23 11.5   
Asian 26 89.66  3 10.34   
Hispanic 196 93.33  14 6.67   
Other 30 96.77  1 3.23   
Missing 12 100  0 0   
 
C. POPULATION REPRESENTATION 
The population representation model is the percentage representation of each race/
ethnic category and sex relative to the population of interest. This is determined by 
dividing the quantity of individuals within that subset by the population total, and 
displaying the results in percentage form.  
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D. REGRESSION MODELS 
Multiple instances of regression analysis were performed to determine the effect 
of the explanatory variables on trial outcomes. Ordinary least squares regressions were 
utilized for models with both binary and continuous dependent variables. The following 
formulas were utilized: 
TrialOutcomei = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Blacki + 𝛽𝛽2Hispanici + 𝛽𝛽3Otheri + 𝛽𝛽4Sexi + 𝛽𝛽5Agei 
+𝛽𝛽6BlackMalei +𝛽𝛽7HispanicMalei +𝛽𝛽8YearsServicei + 𝛽𝛽9CombatArmsi + 𝛽𝛽10Officeri + 
𝛽𝛽11DCandAccusedSame + 𝛽𝛽12TCandAccusedSamei + 𝛽𝛽13MJandAccusedSamei + 
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∑ Reduction - The estimated impact in percentage points to the individual's 
chance of being reduced, as it deviates from the estimate for the reference 
group. 
∑ Discharge - The estimated impact in percentage points to the individual's 
chance of being punitively discharged, as it deviates from the estimate for 
the reference group. 
In models where the impact was isolated to trials with specific charges, the same 
regression was utilized where TrialOutcomei is the dependent variable, but the 
observations were limited only to trials with those specific charges.  
E. NULL HYPOTHESIS 
In performing these diverse regressions, I attempted to verify my null hypothesis: 
 
∑ The chance of conviction and severity of punishment if convicted is 
equitable without regard for that race or ethnicity of the accused Marine.  
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. POPULATION REPRESENTATION 
Prior to regression analysis, I determined the population representation of those 
who faced courts-martial during the sample years. I then compared the population 
representation of the sample with the Marine Corps at large to determine any 
inconsistencies between the two groups. I utilized demographic data made available by 
the Center for Naval Analysis and Force Readiness Division in the annually produced 
“Population Representation in the Military Services” (Pop Rep). At the time of this study, 
the latest available version was from 2018. The courts-martial data spanned 2017–2020 
which allowed two years of overlap to analyze the two respective populations. I 
organized the courts-martial groups identically to the Pop Rep, with categories for male/
female, race, and ethnicity. I was not able to determine if any Marine facing courts-
martial claimed two or more racial groups, so that category was omitted. If a Marine did 
not disclose racial or ethnic data, they were categorized as “Unknown” for race. The only 
two categories for ethnicity are “Hispanic” and “Not Hispanic.” If a Marine's ethnicity 
was not known, they were categorized under “Not Hispanic.” Within this section, the 
categories for male/female, race, and ethnicity all individually sum to 100 percent of the 
observations.  
1. Comparison of Accused Marines to Active Enlisted Marine 
Population 
In 2017, 254 Marines were court-martialed. In 2018, the number was 273. Only 
five and four officers were court-martialed in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Given the 
small sample size, the officer results were not included in this part of the analysis.  
The value of each category is divided by the total number for the year to 
determine percentage. An additional column was added for expected value. This value is 
determined by calculating the equivalent service representation percentage of the court-
martial population for the given year. For instance, there were 91.26 percent male 
Marines in 2018. There were 273 courts-martial that year, and the expected value for 
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male Marines court-martialed in 2018 would be found by multiplying 273 by .9126 and 
rounding to the nearest whole number. The summary for 2017 is found in Table 10, and 
2018 is found in Table 11.  
Table 10. Active Marine Enlisted Population Representation 2017. Source: 
OUSD (2017). 
Individual Characteristic Service-Wide Courts Martial Population Expected 
 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage  Number 
Male 149,352 91.46  245 96.46  232 
Female 13,938 8.54  9 3.54  22 
        
White 130,087 79.67  172 67.72  202 
Black 18,523 11.34  54 21.26  29 
AIAN1 1,749 1.07  6 2.36  3 
Asian 4,468 2.85  7 2.76  7 
NHPI2 1,883 1.15  8 3.15  3 
Two or More Races 1,503 0.92  N/A N/A  N/
A 
Unknown 4,897 3  7 3.15  8 
        
Hispanic 36,096 22.11   58 22.83  56 
Not Hispanic 127,194 77.89  196 77.17  198 
        
Total 
 
163,290   254    
1. American Indian, Alaska Native 
2. Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander 
 
Table 11. Active Marine Enlisted Population Representation 2018. Source: 
OUSD (2018). 
Individual Characteristic Service-Wide Courts Martial Population Expected 
 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage  Number
Male 149,740 91.26  261 95.60  249 
Female 14,343 8.74  12 4.40  24 
        
White 131,283 80.01  191 69.96  218 
Black 18,264 11.13  59 21.61  31 
AIAN1 1,735 1.06  4 1.47  3 
Asian 4,739 2.89  13 4.76  8 
NHPI2 1,853 1.13  3 1.15  3 
Two or More Races 1,667 1.02  N/A N/A   
Unknown 4,542 2.77  3 1.10  8 
        
Hispanic 37,896 23.10  69 25.27  63 
Not Hispanic 126,187 76.96  204 74.73  210 





  273    
1. American Indian, Alaska Native 
2. Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander 
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The results of this analysis showed several instances of both over- and under-
representation. Most significantly, Black Marines comprised 11.34 percent and 11.13 
percent of the Marine Corps population in 2017 and 2018, respectively (OUSD 2017, 
2018). However, Black Marines represented 21.26 percent and 21.61 percent of the court-
martial population for those years, approximately double their service representation. The 
actual number of Black Marines court-martialed exceeded the expected number by 86 
percent and 90 percent. White Marines were underrepresented in both years by 
approximately 10 percent, males were over-represented by approximately 5 percent, and 
females were similarly underrepresented. There was not a large quantity of Asian, 
American Indian/Alaska Native, or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander Marines court-
martialed in these years, but their expected quantity did not deviate significantly from 
courts-marital population, with the exception of Asians in 2018 who saw 13 individuals 
with the expected number of 8.  
The Hispanic population of those court-martialed was similar to the service 
population for both years. The same was true for the non-Hispanic population for both 
years, with no more than 2 percent deviation between the two populations.  
I continued to break-down the courts-martial population for 2019 and 2020 even 
though Pop Rep data was not available for those years. The percentages of the court-
martial population categories remained consistent. Notably, the White population was 70 
percent for 2019 and 68.24 percent for 2020. The Black population was 23.47 percent 
and 21.62 percent for the same years. The tables for 2019 and 2020 are located in 
Appendix A.  
Figure 2 shows the bar plot of percentages for each category for 2017, and Figure 
3 shows the same information for 2018. The vertical axis represents the population 
percentage and the horizontal axis represents each individual demographic category. 
Marine Corps at large figures are gray, and the court-martial population is brown.  
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Figure 2. 2017 Pop Rep Data Bar Plot. Source: OUSD (2017). 
 
Figure 3. 2018 Pop Rep Data Bar Plot. Source: OUSD (2018). 
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2. Comparison of Accused Marines to Military Justice Practitioners 
I analyzed the race/ethnic composition of the accused and military justice 
practitioner populations to similarly identify any notable differences between the two 
groups. In this section, race and ethnicity have been pooled together, with an indicated 
ethnicity of Hispanic taking precedence over any indicated race. For instance, an 
individual who indicated an ethnicity of Hispanic but also a race of White was only 
coded as Hispanic. This is detailed in Table 12.  
Table 12. Accused and Military Justice Practitioners Race/Ethnicity 
Percentages 
Race/Ethnicity  Accused      Trial Counsel          Defense Counsel   Military Judge  
Mili 
 
There is a noteworthy difference in the composition of the two groups. Black and 
Hispanic Marines comprise 21.69 percent and 22.78 percent of those court-martialed, but 
much less for the military justice practitioners. A simple probability calculation from 
Table 12 shows that there is roughly a 32 percent chance that a courtroom on a given date 
will be staffed with only White personnel. The implications are that a minority Marine 
has a significant chance of walking into the courtroom and not seeing any military justice 
practitioners who look like them. Within my dataset, 32 percent of the time a Black 
Marine was tried, the counsel and military judge were uniformly White. For Hispanic 
Marines, the same figure was 29.52 percent. I make no claims regarding any causation 
between the race/ethnicity of military justice practitioners relative to the accused and trial 
outcomes, but it is a notable instance of disparate representation of minorities relative to 
their White counterparts within both groups.  
 
                  Number      Percentage      Number Percentage  Number Percentage Number Percentage  
          
White 440 47.72  727 78.85  644 69.85 535 58.03 
Black 200 21.69  15 1.62  25 2.71 86 9.33 
Asian 29 3.15  12 1.3  39 4.23 26 2.82 
Hispanic 210 22.78  58 6.29  31 3.36 74 8.02 
Other 31 3.36  69 7.48  23 2.49 0 0 
Missing 12 1.3  41 4.45  160 17.35 201 21.80 
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The figures for military justice practitioners are not unique observations and 
represent the race/ethnicity of whoever was present for a given observation. Often, a 
single individual served in multiple trials. A separate table with the race/ethnic details of 
the unique observations of all military justice practitioners is included in Appendix B. It 
should be noted that among unique observations, the population proportions of military 
justice practitioners approximate those of the officer population in the Marine Corps at 
large with slight under-representation of Black and Hispanic Marines. Officer population 
representation data in the Marine Corps for 2018 is found in Appendix C.  
3. Rates of Non-Judicial Punishment Among Court-Martialed Marines   
Lastly, I examined the rate of NJP among the Marines who were court-martialed 
in the dataset. If a Marine ever received an NJP during their career, it was indicated by 
the presence of the NJP indicator flag within the data I requested. The summary of the 
findings is detailed in Table 13. 
Table 13. Rate of NJP Among Court-Martialed Marines  
Individual Characteristic Courts-Martial Population NJP Flag  
 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage    
       
White 440 47.72  131 29.77   
Black 200 21.69  89 44.5   
Asian 29 3.15  11 37.93   
Hispanic 210 22.78  48 22.86   
Other 31 3.36  9 29.03   
Missing 12 1.3  4 33.33   
 
The rate of NJP is 14.73 percentage points higher for Black Marines compared to 
their White counterparts. Asian Marines also saw higher rates of NJP, but with a smaller 
sample size. Hispanic Marines were slightly less likely to have received NJP compared to 
White Marines.  
4. Context and Comparison to U.S. Civilian Arrest Records in 2019   
It is important to analyze parallel civilian data to establish a reference point for 
this analysis. I chose to compare Marines tried at courts-martial to civilian arrests, as a 
civilian arrest does not necessarily indicate an individual is convicted of a crime, similar 
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to being tried at courts-martial does not necessarily equate to a conviction. This is not a 
truly analogous comparison, but represents a useful approximation based on the 
similarities between the civilian and military justice systems. In 2019, there were 
6,816,975 arrests made in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019). Of 
those arrests, 4,729,290 were White and 1,815,144 were black. The total percentage of 
arrests for White individuals was 69.38 percent, which approximates the representation in 
the courts-martial data. The percentage of arrests for Black individuals was 26.62 
percent, which is higher than the representation in the courts-martial data. (FBI, 2019). 
The respective population percentages for the U.S. at large in 2019 was 76.3 percent for 
White individuals and 13.4 percent for Black individuals, which is also similar to the 
Marine Corps population representation for 2017 and 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). 
Notably, the under-representation for court-martialed White Marines is similar to the U.S. 
arrest data, and the over-representation for court-martialed Black Marines was slightly 
less in the Marine Corps than U.S. arrest data. A summary of this data is provided in 
Table 14.  
Table 14. U.S. Civilian Arrests Population Representation in 2019. Sources: 
FBI (2019), U.S. Census Bureau (2019). 
Individual 
Characteristic 
U.S. Population U.S. Civilian Arrests  
 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage    
       
White 250,446,756 76.3  4,729,290 69.38   
Black 43,984,096 13.4  1,815,144 26.62   
        
Total 328,239,523   6,816,975    
 
5. Summary 
This analysis of the population representations shows that Black Marines 
experience courts-martial and NJP at a rate higher than any other race/ethnic group. 
There is also much less representation of minorities within military justice practitioners 
relative to the racial/ethnic makeup of the general population of enlisted Marines. These 
multiple instances of over- and under-representation elicit the question of whether this 
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disparity extends to trial outcomes and punishments. Given the broad chasm of 
representation, I aimed to measure whether the similarity or dissimilarity of the race/
ethnicity of the accused and military justice practitioners had any effect on outcomes and 
punishments in my regression models.  
B. REGRESSION MODELS  
There were 12 observations where the accused declined to provide any race/ethnic 
data. Those observations were dropped, and the final dataset utilized for regression 
analysis contained 910 observations. The minimum acceptable lower bound for statistical 
significance for coefficients in this section is 90 percent. That is, I only note the 
coefficient if the effect of the given explanatory variable on the dependent variable (Trial 
Outcome, Punishments) is statistically greater than zero at the 10 percent significance 
level. 
I performed each regression model three times, with each additional iteration 
adding additional explanatory variables while keeping the same dependent variable. This 
demonstrated the effect of adding additional explanatory and control variables to the 
individual coefficients. If a variable was not present within the model, that variable was 
omitted from the summary table. For instance, no females were included in any trials 
involving sexual misconduct charges and the variable for sex is subsequently omitted. 
Where an individual coefficient is discussed, it is implied that the effects of that 
coefficient are valid given all other variables in the model are held constant. Listed 
percentage point deviations of likelihood, months of confinement, and dollar amount of 
forfeitures/fines are relative to the reference group, which is non-Hispanic White and 
Asian Marines.  
1. Trial Outcomes 
a. All Charges 
The model with trial outcomes as the dependent variable with no other limitations 
on the dataset produced a single statistically significant coefficient. An individual whose 
race is “Other” is 8.2 percentage points more likely to be convicted at courts-martial than 
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the reference group. The sample size for this category is only 31 individuals, but this 
echoes the higher conviction rate for “Other,” as mentioned previously in the summary 
statistics portion and shown in Table 9. No other racial, ethnic, demographic, or service 
characteristic for the accused or military justice practitioner had any significant impact on 
trial outcomes within this model. Coefficients and z statistics for this model are detailed 
in Table 15.  
Table 15. Chance of Conviction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black -0.018 -0.016 -0.093 
 (-0.68) (-0.60) (-0.64) 
    
Hispanic 0.028 0.029 -0.006 
 (1.30) (1.35) (-0.04) 
    
Other 0.060+ 0.065+ 0.082+ 
 (1.74) (1.96) (1.84) 
    
Accused is male 0.068 0.072 0.014 
 (1.02) (1.11) (0.16) 
    
Age of the accused  -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.72) (-0.69) 
    
Years of service  -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.48) (-0.52) 
    
Infantry MOS  0.023 0.024 
  (1.13) (1.15) 
    
Accused is an officer  -0.048 -0.046 
  (-0.36) (-0.35) 
    
Black male   0.099 
   (0.69) 
    
Hispanic male   0.052 
   (0.35) 
    
Accused and DC same race/eth   0.023 
   (0.77) 
    
Accused and TC same race/eth   0.000 
   (0.02) 
    
Accused and MJ same race/eth   0.000 
   (0.02) 
    
Observations 910 910 910 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
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b. Trial Outcomes with Drug Charges 
When limiting the outcomes to only trials that featured charges under article 112a 
of the UCMJ, the sample size decreased to 212 observations. Initially, “Other” 
demonstrated significant coefficients, but as more controls were added the significance 
decreased beyond the acceptable threshold. In the final iteration, Age showed a small 
negative impact to chance of conviction at trials with drug charges. Each additional year 
of age decreases the chance of conviction by 2.1 percentage points. The coefficient for 
“Officer” showed strong statistical significance, but with only two observations falling 
within this category, the results for that coefficient should be disregarded. Coefficients 
and z statistics for this model are detailed in Table 16.  
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Table 16. Chance of Conviction for Trials with Drug Charges 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black -0.023 -0.035 -0.280 
 (-0.50) (-0.75) (-1.11) 
    
Hispanic 0.041 0.032 -0.030 
 (1.18) (0.97) (-0.71) 
    
Other 0.130+ 0.117+ 0.108 
 (1.94) (1.75) (1.37) 
    
Accused is male 0.055 0.049 -0.034 
 (0.71) (0.62) (-1.47) 
    
Age of the accused -0.032*** -0.021+ -0.021+ 
 (-3.81) (-1.77) (-1.73) 
    
Years of service  -0.008 -0.007 
  (-0.54) (-0.45) 
    
Infantry MOS  0.007 0.013 
  (0.23) (0.38) 
    
Accused is an officer  -0.752*** -0.730*** 
  (-6.55) (-5.72) 
    
Black male   0.245 
   (0.95) 
    
Hispanic male   0.053 
   (1.32) 
    
Accused and DC same race/eth   -0.032 
   (-0.59) 
    
Accused and TC same race/eth   -0.015 
   (-0.44) 
    
Accused and MJ same race/eth   0.046 
   (1.20) 
    
Observations 212 212 212 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
 
c. Trial Outcomes with Sexual Misconduct Charges 
When limiting the outcomes to only trials which featured sexual misconduct 
charges, the sample size decreased to 198 observations. “Other” is again noted with a 
significant coefficient, but there are only 6 individuals within this category, so the 
coefficient is disregarded due to small sample subset. An increase to years of service 
corresponds with a slight decrease to chance of conviction, with each year of service 
decreasing the chance of by 1.6 percentage points. Individuals holding an infantry MOS 
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were more likely to face conviction compared to those who do not, with a 9.5 percentage 
point increase to conviction likelihood. Coefficients and z statistics for this model are 
detailed in Table 17.  
Table 17. Chance of Conviction for Trials with Sexual Misconduct Charges 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black 0.016 0.021 0.110 
 (0.27) (0.36) (1.04) 
    
Hispanic 0.038 0.048 0.132 
 (0.79) (0.99) (1.44) 
    
Other 0.122*** 0.145*** 0.236* 
 (3.59) (3.82) (2.35) 
    
Age of the accused -0.004 0.013+ 0.012 
 (-1.19) (1.90) (1.51) 
    
Years of service  -0.018* -0.016+ 
  (-2.05) (-1.81) 
    
Infantry MOS  0.094* 0.095* 
  (2.52) (2.31) 
    
Accused and DC same race/eth   0.037 
   (0.56) 
    
Accused and TC same race/eth   0.075 
   (1.04) 
    
Accused and MJ same race/eth   -0.004 
   (-0.06) 
    
Observations 198 198 198 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
 
d. Trial Outcomes with Charges Under the General Article 
When limiting the outcomes to only trials that featured charges under the general 
article of the UCMJ, the sample size decreased to 294 observations. Officers are 7.4 
percentage points more likely to face conviction under this model. There are no other 
significant variables for trials with charges under the general article. Coefficients and z 
statistics for this model are detailed in Table 18.  
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Table 18. Chance of Conviction for Trials with Charges Under the General 
Article 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black -0.006 -0.005 0.028 
 (-0.22) (-0.18) (0.65) 
    
Hispanic -0.011 -0.012 0.028 
 (-0.37) (-0.39) (0.58) 
    
Other 0.033* 0.035* 0.081 
 (2.11) (2.21) (1.59) 
    
Accused is male -0.035* -0.036* -0.034 
 (-2.25) (-2.09) (-0.90) 
    
Age of the accused -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.47) 
    
Years of service 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (1.36) (1.33) (1.38) 
    
Infantry MOS  0.004 0.005 
  (0.17) (0.20) 
    
Accused is an officer  0.070 0.074+ 
  (1.62) (1.66) 
    
Black male   0.009 
   (0.18) 
    
Accused and DC same race/eth   0.006 
   (0.19) 
    
Accused and TC same race/eth   0.022 
   (0.60) 
    
Accused and MJ same race/eth   0.035 
   (1.48) 
    
Observations 294 294 294 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
 
2. Punishments 
The following regression models are limited to only observations where the 
accused was found guilty, with a sample size of 828 observations unless otherwise stated.  
a. Length of Confinement  
Of the 828 convictions, 704 resulted in some length of confinement. Of those 704 
instances, 32 were awarded lengths of confinement in excess of 100 months. These 
observations skewed the model's estimations as it attempted to account for the large 
values of the outliers relative to the rest of the observations. To counteract these effects 
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and get a more precise estimation of the subset, I limited the sample to only months of 
confinement under 100 months. Prior to limiting the sample, the mean length of 
confinement was 28.27 months with a standard deviation of 67.66. Limiting to only 
observations below 100 months reduced the mean confinement time to 14.62 months 
with a standard deviation of 19.25. 
This model yielded several significant coefficients. Males were likely to be 
awarded 7.046 more months of confinement than females. The figure was an additional 
7.593 months of confinement for Hispanic males. This model also produced one of the 
only statistically significant coefficients for the interaction variables between the race of 
the accused and military justice practitioners. Where the accused and military judge were 
the same race/ethnicity, the model estimates 2.533 additional months of confinement 
compared to trials where there is not a common race/ethnicity between the two. 
Coefficients and z statistics for this model are detailed in Table 19.   
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Table 19. Length of Confinement Given Conviction at Trial 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black -0.261 -0.354 1.232 
 (-0.17) (-0.22) (0.41) 
    
Hispanic 3.407* 3.226+ -2.118 
 (1.98) (1.84) (-0.81) 
    
Other 3.754 3.383 5.687 
 (0.83) (0.73) (1.15) 
    
Accused is male 8.999*** 9.190*** 7.046*** 
 (6.57) (6.51) (3.51) 
    
Age of the accused  -0.385 -0.400 
  (-1.35) (-1.41) 
    
Years of service  0.518 0.546 
  (1.55) (1.64) 
    
Infantry MOS  -1.815 -1.791 
  (-1.18) (-1.16) 
    
Accused is an officer  4.817 4.986 
  (0.60) (0.64) 
    
Black male   0.459 
   (0.15) 
    
Hispanic male   7.593** 
   (2.87) 
    
Accused and DC Same Race/eth   0.944 
   (0.55) 
    
Accused and TC Same Race/eth   0.107 
   (0.07) 
    
Accused and MJ Same Race/eth   2.533+ 
   (1.66) 
Observations 796 796 796 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats or standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
 
b. Fines and Forfeitures 
It was difficult to isolate instances where fines and forfeitures were free from the 
external effects of mandatory minimum sentencing or discretionary withholding for the 
sake of the accused's dependents. As detailed in the methodology section, I attempted to 
remove or limit amounts subject to either external factor and only capture amounts 
adjudged by the sentencing authority. 
Marines holding an infantry MOS were estimated to be awarded a slightly less 
amount of fines or forfeitures compared to those who do not hold an infantry MOS. 
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Instances where the accused and trial counsel were the same race yielded a slightly higher 
estimate.  
Given the difficulty in ascertaining whether the amount of fine or forfeiture 
awarded by the court-martial is independent of the listed externalities, I do not place a 
high level of confidence in the significant coefficients produced by this model. 
Coefficients and z statistics for this model are detailed in Table 20.   
Table 20. Fines and Forfeitures  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black 5.915 -28.985 1297.414 
 (0.03) (-0.13) (1.37) 
    
Hispanic -80.554 -110.062 -22.328 
 (-0.39) (-0.50) (-0.05) 
    
Other -280.349 -327.210 -249.580 
 (-1.10) (-1.14) (-0.87) 
    
Accused is male -585.458 -535.460 -54.860 
 (-1.44) (-1.31) (-0.18) 
    
Age of the accused 13.620 13.068 14.461 
 (0.35) (0.33) (0.36) 
    
Years of service 50.941 54.828 49.668 
 (1.02) (1.01) (0.98) 
    
Infantry MOS  -247.437* -250.854* 
  (-2.46) (-2.47) 
    
Accused is an officer  -623.643 -657.232 
  (-0.46) (-0.48) 
    
Black male   -1272.929 
   (-1.34) 
    
Hispanic male   12.974 
   (0.03) 
    
Accused and DC Same Race/eth   87.551 
   (0.51) 
    
Accused and TC Same Race/eth   235.617+ 
   (1.67) 
    
Accused and MJ Same Race/eth   -273.978 
   (-0.98) 
    
Observations 828 828 828 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
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c. Punitive Discharge 
Among those convicted at courts-martial, individuals with a racial category of 
“Other” were 18.2 percentage points more likely to be awarded a punitive discharge. 
Officers were also 22.98 percentage points more likely to face a discharge compared to 
enlisted members, and instances where the defense counsel and accused, and military 
judge and the accused were the same race both showed an 8.4 percentage point increase 
to the likelihood of punitive discharge.  
Table 21. Chance of Punitive Discharge 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black -0.064 -0.060 -0.217 
 (-1.55) (-1.51) (-1.09) 
    
Hispanic -0.030 -0.028 -0.337 
 (-0.78) (-0.74) (-1.51) 
    
Other 0.086 0.095 0.182* 
 (1.20) (1.42) (2.10) 
    
Accused is male 0.097 0.134 -0.066 
 (1.01) (1.40) (-0.51) 
    
Age of the accused  -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.36) (-0.36) 
    
Years of service  -0.016 -0.015 
  (-1.61) (-1.61) 
    
Infantry MOS  -0.038 -0.036 
  (-0.97) (-0.94) 
    
Accused is an officer  0.218 0.229 
  (1.33) (1.44) 
    
Black male   0.244 
   (1.21) 
    
Hispanic male   0.398+ 
   (1.76) 
    
Accused and DC Same Race/eth   0.084+ 
   (1.87) 
    
Accused and TC Same Race/eth   -0.032 
   (-0.68) 
    
Accused and MJ Same Race/eth   0.084* 
   (2.26) 
    
Observations 828 828 828 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
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d. Grade Reduction 
This model shows that age has a negative correlation with chance of grade 
reduction, but years of service has a positive correlation. This is unexpected, as age and 
years of service increase together throughout the course of an individual's career. Given 
the similarities of the coefficients, a year increase to both age and years of service would 
essentially cancel out the effects of each other. Individuals holding an infantry MOS are 
10.5 percentage points more likely to face a grade reduction compared to Marines who do 
not. No other individual characteristics showed any statistical significance in this model. 
Details of this regression are listed in Table 22.  
Table 22. Chance of Grade Reduction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Black -0.082* -0.090** -0.040 
 (-2.35) (-2.65) (-0.24) 
    
Hispanic -0.020 -0.032 0.139 
 (-0.67) (-1.05) (1.17) 
    
Other -0.074 -0.095 -0.095 
 (-0.99) (-1.25) (-1.07) 
    
Accused is male -0.051 -0.026 0.043 
 (-0.79) (-0.41) (0.35) 
    
Age of the accused  -0.019* -0.019* 
  (-2.37) (-2.40) 
    
Years of service  0.020* 0.021* 
  (2.40) (2.45) 
    
Infantry MOS  -0.104** -0.105** 
  (-2.99) (-2.99) 
    
Black male   -0.049 
   (-0.29) 
    
Hispanic male   -0.175 
   (-1.41) 
    
Accused and DC Same Race/eth   0.000 
   (0.01) 
    
Accused and TC Same Race/eth   -0.004 
   (-0.12) 
    
Accused and MJ Same Race/eth   0.008 
   (0.28) 
Observations 827 827 827 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
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3. Jury versus Judge 
Lastly, I attempted to determine if the chance of conviction or severity of 
punishment was influenced by trials where the determination of guilt and sentencing 
authority was performed by a jury, relative to those trials with only a military judge. In 
response to the Military Justice Act of 2016, the UCMJ was modified to change the way 
the accused is sentenced, specifically in article 53(b). Previously, if the court-martial was 
comprised of a jury, that jury also served as the sentencing authority for punishments. For 
cases referred to courts-martial after 1 January 2019 in which the accused elects for the 
courts-martial to be comprised of a jury, the accused may determine whether they wish to 
be sentenced by the jury or the military judge alone (Findings and Sentencing, 2019). If a 
court-martial is comprised of a judge, the judge is the sentencing authority.  
I am not able to determine the sentencing authority for trials with a jury in 2019 
and 2020. For trials in 2017 and 2018, the sentencing authority is the jury if present, and 
the judge otherwise. In order to isolate the effects of the presence of a jury, I limited the 
sample to only trials taking place in 2017 and 2018 and ran the regression for chance of 
conviction and months of confinement awarded. I do not discuss the Jury vs. Judge model 
for every iteration of earlier regressions due to decreasing sample size and lack of 
significant results.  
a. Chance of Conviction 
The coefficient for Other was significant for judge trials, but there were only four 
instances of an individual with a racial category of Other who was tried in jury trial 
between 2017 and 2018. Males who were tried by a judge alone were less likely to face 
conviction than females, and officers were more likely to be convicted by a jury. No 
other racial/ethnic or demographic factors were significant in this model. Details are 




Table 23. Chance of Conviction, Judge Trials Versus Jury Trials, 2017–2018 
 Judge Trial Jury Trial 
Black 0.033 -0.325 
 (0.94) (-0.88) 
   
Hispanic 0.021 -0.274 
 (0.70) (-0.66) 
   
Other 0.143** -0.006 
 (2.65) (-0.02) 
   
Accused is male -0.112** -0.051 
 (-3.14) (-0.92) 
   
Age of the accused 0.000 -0.007 
 (0.04) (-0.40) 
   
Black male 0.009 0.534 
 (0.18) (1.50) 
   
Hispanic male 0.071 0.419 
 (1.59) (1.05) 
   
Years of service -0.004 0.004 
 (-0.60) (0.19) 
   
Infantry MOS 0.021 0.067 
 (0.64) (1.25) 
   
Accused is an officer -0.068 0.205+ 
 (-0.40) (1.92) 
   
Accused and DC Same Race/eth 0.042 0.151 
 (0.92) (1.26) 
   
Accused and TC Same Race/eth 0.022 -0.023 
 (0.48) (-0.34) 
   
Accused and MJ Same Race/eth 0.001 0.066 
 (0.05) (0.76) 
   
Observations 428 106 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
 
b. Length of Confinement  
I only analyzed one aspect of punishment given a conviction, both to compare the 
results to the unrestricted sample, and to also show any differences in the outcomes 
between a military judge and a jury. Male was a significant factor for increased length of 
confinement for the model with only the military judge, as was Hispanic male. These are 
the same two coefficients that were significant for the unrestricted model of length of 
confinement. The sample size decreases for the courts-martial where the jury was the 
sentencing authority. This compounds some of the results, for instance, only two 
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Hispanic females were tried in this category, making the interpretation of the Hispanic 
and Hispanic male coefficients dubious. Given the interactive effects of Hispanic and 
Hispanic male, Hispanic males were still likely to face longer confinement periods with 
statistical significance in this model. For jury trials, an increase in age of the accused was 
indicative of a decreased confinement sentence, increased years of service indicated a 
longer sentence, and officers were likely to receive a shorter confinement period.  
Table 24. Length of Confinement Given Conviction at Trial, Judge Versus 
Jury Trials 2017–2018 
 Judge Trial Jury Trial 
Black 5.998 1.815 
 (1.50) (0.37) 
   
Hispanic 0.434 -20.166+ 
 (0.14) (-1.80) 
   
Other 3.183 24.666 
 (0.54) (1.00) 
   
Accused is male 10.255** 0.065 
 (2.94) (0.01) 
   
Age of the accused -0.573 -1.952* 
 (-1.39) (-2.61) 
   
Black male -3.040 -1.935 
 (-0.63) (-0.20) 
   
Hispanic male 7.598+ 28.604*** 
 (1.77) (3.75) 
   
Years of service 0.660 2.860** 
 (1.49) (2.80) 
   
Infantry MOS 0.500 -7.169 
 (0.19) (-1.52) 
   
Accused is an officer 15.758 -31.080* 
 (1.29) (-2.53) 
   
Accused and DC Same Race/eth 2.902 -1.995 
 (1.14) (-0.55) 
   
Accused and TC Same Race/eth -0.441 3.454 
 (-0.16) (0.49) 
   
Accused and MJ Same Race/eth 1.412 -3.091 
 (0.61) (-0.43) 
   
Observations 374 86 
z statistics in parentheses 
All z-stats corrected for heteroskedasticity 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .001 
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VI. FINDINGS 
A. POPULATION REPRESENTATION 
(1) Courts-Martial Population 
I found significant over-representation among Black Marines within the courts-
martial population. Black Marines were over-represented by an average of 10.2 
percentage points compared to their service representation percentage in 2017–2018. 
White Marines were under-represented by an average of 11 percentage points compared 
to their service representation percentage during that same period. No other racial/ethnic 
categories significantly deviated between the two populations. This suggests that within 
the years of analysis, Black Marines are more likely to face courts-martial and thus 
comprised a greater percentage of the courts-martial population than a random sample 
would produce. The converse is true for White Marines, with sustained under-
representation and decreased chance of courts-martial.  
(2) Non-Judicial Punishment 
Black Marines within the courts-martial population were also more likely to have 
been the subject of NJP during their career compared to the sample average. Black 
Marines were the subject of NJP 44.5 percent of the time, while the sample average was 
31.7 percent. White Marines within the courts-martial population were the subject of NJP 
29.77 percent of the time.  
(3) Military Justice Practitioners 
Among the trial counsel, defense counsel, and military judge, Black Marines and 
Hispanic Marines represented only 7 and 6.5 percent of the population, respectively. This 
is based upon a weighted average of courtroom observations. This contrasts to 21.69 
percent for Black Marines and 22.78 percent for Hispanic Marines among the accused. 
As such, within this sample Black Marines were only represented by a Black Defense 
Counsel on 2 out of 200 occasions, and only faced a Black Military Judge 17 times out of 
200. Hispanic Marines were represented by a Hispanic Defense Counsel 11 times out of 
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210, and a Hispanic Judge 21 times out of 210. 32 percent of the time, a Black Marine 
accused at courts-martial faced a trio of all White military justice practitioners. That same 
figure was 29.52 percent for Hispanic Marines.  
(4) Summary 
In terms of population percentages mentioned in the preceding categories, I did 
find evidence of systemic misrepresentation. I am not in the position to make definitive 
claims regarding the validity of the charges or accusations of misconduct that led to 
disparate rates of non-judicial punishment and courts-martial population representation 
for Black Marines. I similarly cannot make any attempts to explain the population 
representation disparities of Black and Hispanic Marines within the 4402 community, and 
subsequently the reality whereby Black and Hispanic Marines find themselves much less 
likely to experience a trial with Military Justice Practitioners that look like themselves. I 
do claim that these inconsistencies are evidence for some systemic mechanism that tilts 
the scale of equity away from Black and Hispanic Marines, in these instances. 
B. COURTS-MARTIAL 
(1) Trial Outcomes 
I did not find evidence for broad differences in the outcomes of trials at courts-
martial from 2017 to 2020 based on race/ethnicity. The only exception in terms of trial 
outcomes was for individuals with a racial category of “Other,” which includes Native 
Hawaiians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and Alaskan Natives, and any ethnicity 
other than Hispanic. Individuals in this category saw an increased likelihood for 
conviction at courts-martial. It should be noted that individuals in the “Other” category 
only comprised 31 out of 910 observations, but 30 of those individuals were convicted, a 
rate higher than the sample mean. There were no other indications among the regressions 
featuring trial outcome as the dependent variable where race/ethnicity played a 
significant factor in the outcome. There was also no indication of any influence in the 
outcome of the trial in instances when the accused and the corresponding military justice 
practitioners shared the same race/ethnicity.  
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Various other demographic and service characteristics were significant when 
predicting trial outcomes. As a Marine's age increased, their likelihood of conviction at a 
trial involving drug charges decreased. Officers were less likely to be convicted at trials 
involving drug charges. An increase in years of service correspondingly decreased the 
likelihood of conviction at trials involving sexual misconduct charges, and Marines with 
an infantry MOS saw an increased likelihood of conviction at trials involving sexual 
misconduct charges.  
(2) Punishments 
I similarly did not find evidence for broad systemic differences in punishment 
severity given a conviction at courts-martial. There were two notable exceptions. 
Hispanic males were more likely to receive greater confinement sentences, and 
individuals with a race/ethnic category of “Other” were more likely to face punitive 
discharge given a conviction at courts-martial.  
Instances when the race/ethnicity of the accused and military justice practitioners 
were the same resulted in several significant coefficients. When the military judge and 
accused were the same, there was a slight increase to chance of confinement and punitive 
discharge. When the trial counsel and accused were the same, there was a slight increase 
to the amount of fines/forfeitures, and when the defense counsel and accused were the 
same, the chance of punitive discharge slightly increased. These findings were relatively 
contrary to expectation and not consistent across models. I do not place a large 
explanatory value on the results of the coefficients within this category.  
There were several demographic and service characteristics that influenced 
punishment severity. Males were more likely to face longer confinement sentences, 
Marines with an infantry MOS were less likely to be reduced and on average faced a 
lesser amount of fines/forfeitures. An increase of age caused a reduction of likelihood of 
reduction, but this was offset by an increase of likelihood for reduction as years of service 
increased. Lastly, officers were more likely to be discharged following a conviction. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary research question I sought to answer while researching this thesis 
was whether the Marine Corps demonstrated equity in trial outcomes for special and 
general courts-martial without regard for race or ethnicity during my sample timeframe. 
Generally, no racial or ethnic characteristic was a strong predictor of conviction or 
punishment severity. The results for conviction rates and chance of discharge for 
individuals with a race in the “Other” category relative to the White and Asian 
population, and also the likelihood that Hispanic Males will face longer confinement 
sentences show there may be instances of inequity among subsets of the larger 
population. This is difficult to determine, as there were only 31 individuals out of 910 
within the “Other” category, and the timeframe of this analysis was not conducive to 
gathering additional years of courts-martial data to increase the sample size. Additionally, 
there may be many underlying factors influencing the greater confinement lengths for 
Hispanic males including the category and severity of the misconduct they were 
convicted of. Confinement lengths are influenced by a number of factors, and without 
further analysis and additional controls, it is difficult to identify exactly why this occurred 
during the sample timeframe.  
I did determine that there is evidence for over-representation of Black Marines 
within the processes that lead them to court-martial. Black Marines are court-martialed 
significantly more often than White Marines relative to their respective service 
population representations. While Black Marines made up 11.24 percent of the Marine 
Corps during 2017–2018, they represented 21.44 percent of the courts-martial population. 
White Marines saw under-representation of approximately 11 percent during that same 
time. This disparity also extends to the higher rates at which Black Marines who were 
court-martialed were the subject of NJP.  
We must assess why Black Marines are court-martialed at a higher rate, and 
whether the processes that lead them to trial are subject to systemic bias. I reject the 
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notion that certain categories of Marines commit more misconduct as a function of their 
race/ethnicity. If indeed there is a systemic mechanism that causes more Black Marines to 
be referred to trial for charges that would be otherwise dealt with extra-judicially for 
other races, true parity in the broad context of the service population representation 
would in fact be a lesser conviction rate for Black Marines for those charges. Military 
justice practitioners are certainly afforded the benefit of the doubt, as they have no way of 
knowing whether charges for a given Black Marine may have been otherwise dealt with 
extra-judicially for a White Marine within their respective units. I am also not suggesting 
that cases be dismissed or acquitted to compensate for disproportionate representation 
statistics. All cases should be tried on their merits based upon the UCMJ, but the over-
representation of Black Marines and under-representation of White Marines within the 
court-martial population is evidence of a lack of uniformity in the processes that lead 
them to trial. 
Despite the nearly uniform conviction rates and lack of significant predictors of 
conviction or severity of punishment based on race/ethnicity, the over-representation of 
Black Marines at courts-martial still infers we are convicting and punishing them at a 
higher rate relative to the general population of Marines. The ostensible equity in trial 
outcomes does nothing to remedy this over-representation, nor does it absolve the 
responsibility to investigate why it exists. Though I do not reject my null hypothesis 
based upon my statistical analysis, this important piece of context makes it difficult to 
claim that there is a lack of systemic bias in the comprehensive military justice process.  
While I determined the racial/ethnic composition of the military justice 
practitioners was dissimilar to the courts-martial population, this is symptomatic of a 
broader under-representation of minorities within the officer ranks in the Marine Corps, 
and is not just limited to those officers with an MOS of 4402. While I determined there 
were no significant impacts to trial outcomes and punishments on occasions when the 
race of the accused and military justice practitioners were the same, this does not 
diminish the question of why there is such significant under-representation of minorities 
not only among military justice practitioners, but also among the officer ranks and 
leadership positions across the Marine Corps.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It would be a worthy endeavor to determine how commands with minority 
leadership fare in terms of disciplinary rates among minority Marines, relative to the 
general population. Marines seek inspiration, direction, and mentorship from their 
leaders. This may be more difficult if Marines find their leadership to be less 
heterogeneous than the communities from which they were recruited. It may also affect 
the way leadership interacts or doesn't interact with those under their charge. It is my 
opinion that the lack of representation of minorities among officers and leadership 
positions may possibly be a contributing factor to the adverse over-representations of 
Black Marines noted in this study.  
Racial and ethnic codes are not uniform across the DoD. Utilizing a common 
method for codifying and storing this information would make large-scale analysis across 
the DoD possible. Many studies that I researched prior to my analysis noted that 
disparities in the ways different services describe racial and ethnic attributes made cross-
service analysis difficult or impossible.  
I recommend that a similar study to this be performed, specifically looking into 
the conviction rates of those with a racial category of “Other.” I recommend a larger 
period of analysis than four years, as a greater sample size is needed to determine 
whether systemic bias exists within the conviction rates of this racial category. 30 of 31 
individuals within this category were convicted, but had one or two been acquitted, the 
conviction percentage and regression coefficients would have likely been insignificant 
relative to the sample mean. A larger sample size would make the subset less prone to 
large impacts from single observations and produce a more reliable reflection of the true 
population. 
The coefficient for greater confinement lengths for Hispanic males was notable 
and should be further investigated to better determine the cause. More detailed trial data 
and information gathered from the command investigations associated with the 
misconduct would shed better light on why Hispanic males are facing longer confinement 
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sentences given a conviction at trial, and whether this is an instance of systemic bias or 
due to some other factor.  
The data needed to perform regression analysis was neither easily obtained nor 
amenable to performing diverse regressions. I recommend that the Marine Corps' case 
management system for courts-martial (whether CMS-LA or Wolverine) directly 
interface with MCTFS to capture and populate race/ethnic and demographic data on the 
accused and military justice practitioners consistently and accurately. This would 
eliminate the need to request data from two locations, clean both data sets, merge, and 
cross validate, all of which may lead to errors in both data entry and subsequent analysis. 
Utilizing the EDIPI of the accused and military justice practitioners, MCTFS can 
accurately retrieve and store the data for immediate analysis within the legal database. 
Reports of summary statistics could be run directly from the software, similar to 
Command Profile analysis available from the M&RA web portal. Additionally, it would 
be useful for the sake of analysis if the UCMJ articles under which an individual was 
charged and convicted were delineated into an independent data-field. Any insight to 
which charges were present required individual analysis of the “pleas and findings” 
paragraph of each observation that often did not state any final disposition or which 
charges led to the conviction.  
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APPENDIX A. MARINE COURT MARTIAL POPULATION DATA 
2019–2020 
 
Individual Characteristic                           Service-Wide Not Available Courts Martial Population  
 
 Number Percentage  Number Percentage   
Male    225 97.82    
Female    5 2.17    
         
White    161 70.00    
Black    54 23.47    
AIAN1    1 0.43    
Asian    2 0.87    
NHPI2    6 2.61    
Two or More Races    N/A     
Unknown    6 2.61    
         
Hispanic    54 23.48    
Not Hispanic    176 76.52    
         
Total    230     
1. American Indian, Alaska Native 
2. Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander 
Table 25. Active Marine Enlisted Courts-Martial Population Representation 
2019 
 
Individual Characteristic                           Service-Wide Not Available Courts Martial Population  
 
 Number Percentage    Number Percentage   
Male    142 95.95   
Female    6 4.05   
        
White    101 68.24   
Black     32 21.62   
AIAN1    3 2.03   
Asian    5 3.38   
NHPI2    2 1.35   
Two or More Races    N/A    
Unknown    5 3.38   
        
Hispanic    34 22.97   
Not Hispanic    114 77.03   
        
Total    148    
1. American Indian, Alaska Native 
2. Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander 
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APPENDIX  B. RACE/ETHNICITY OF UNIQUE OBSERVATIONS 
OF MILITARY JUSTICE PRACTITIONERS WITHIN SAMPLE 
2017–2020 
Race/Ethnicity  Trial Counsel  Defense Counsel                  Military Judge  
Mili 
Table 27. Race/Ethnicity of Unique Observations of Military Justice 
Practitioners within Sample 2017–2020 
  
         Number Percentage  Number Percentage Number Percentage  
          
White   135 83.33  118 80.27 27 79.41 
Black   5 3.09  7 4.76 2 5.88 
Asian   2 1.23  5 3.4 2 5.88 
Hispanic   7 4.3  7 4.76 2 5.88 
Other   8 4.94  3 2.04 0 0 
Declined & not missing   5 3.09  7 4.76 1 2.94 
          
Total  162       146   34    
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APPENDIX  C. MARINE CORPS ACTIVE DUTY OFFICER 
POPULATION REPRESENTATION, 2018 
 
Individual Characteristic                                       Service-Wide   
 
 Number Percentage      
Male 17,654 92.03      
Female 1,528 7.97      
        
White 15,428 80.82      
Black 1,006 5.24      
AIAN1 175 0.91      
Asian 677 3.53      
NHPI2 112 0.58      
Two or More Races 327 1.70      
Unknown 1,457 7.60      
        
Hispanic 1,762 9.19      
Not Hispanic 17,420 90.81      
        
Total 
 
19,182       
1. American Indian, Alaska Native 
2. Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander 
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